8000 docs: BED-5873 Clean up addl refs to old support site by StephenHinck · Pull Request #1433 · SpecterOps/BloodHound · GitHub
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May 2, 2025
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docs: BED-5873 Clean up addl refs to old support site #1433

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docs: BED-5873 Clean up addl refs to old support site
StephenHinck May 2, 2025
ff5593b
docs: update small typo
StephenHinck May 2, 2025
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8000 8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions docs/docs.json
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Expand Up @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@
"resources/release-notes/v6-4-0",
{
"group": "Archive",
"pages": [
"pages": [
"resources/release-notes/2024-12-09-v6-3-0",
"resources/release-notes/2024-11-14-v6-2-0",
"resources/release-notes/2024-10-22-v6-1-0",
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -880,13 +880,13 @@
"links": [
{
"label": "Support",
"href": "https://support.bloodhoundenterprise.io/hc/en-us/requests/new?utm_campaign=&utm_medium=&utm_source=&utm_term=&utm_content=&Latest_Campaign="
"href": "https://support.bloodhoundenterprise.io/hc/en-us/requests/new"
}
],
"primary": {
"type": "button",
"label": "Contact Us",
"href": "https://specterops.io/contact/?_gl=1*1lu38w6*_up*MQ..*_ga*NTYxMzY4OTkxLjE3MzMzMDkyNTk.*_ga_53SGLN9EBJ*MTczMzMwOTI1Ny4xLjAuMTczMzMwOTI1Ny4wLjAuMA.."
"href": "https://specterops.io/contact/"
}
},
"footer": {
Expand All @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@
"website": "https://infosec.exchange/@SpecterOps",
"github": "https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound",
"linkedin": "https://www.linkedin.com/company/specterops",
"slack": "https://join.slack.com/t/bloodhoundhq/shared_invite/zt-1tgq6ojd2-ixpx5nz9Wjtbhc3i8AVAWw",
"slack": "https://ghst.ly/BHSlack",
"instagram": "https://www.instagram.com/specterops.io/",
"youtube": "https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWMKKqCCQkUjU8dIyiL1yhQ"
}
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/get-started/quickstart/community-edition-quickstart.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -157,13 +157,13 @@ BloodHound CE deploys in a traditional multi-tier container architecture consist
</CodeGroup>


6. 1. Go to [http://localhost:8080/ui/login](http://localhost:8080/ui/login), and log in with `admin` and the randomly generated password from the last installation step.
6. Go to [http://localhost:8080/ui/login](http://localhost:8080/ui/login), and log in with `admin` and the randomly generated password from the last installation step.

<Note>
The default `docker-compose.yml` example binds only to localhost (127.0.0.1). To access BloodHound outside of localhost, follow the instructions in [examples/docker-compose/README.md](https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound/blob/main/examples/docker-compose/README.md) to configure host binding for the container.
</Note>

6. Reset the password as prompted.
7. Reset the password as prompted.

You're now logged in to a locally hosted BloodHound CE tenant running with Docker Compose.

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/add-member.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ By adding yourself to a group and refreshing your token, you gain all the same p

See this clip for an example of this edge being abused:

<iframe id="youtube-8345" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for Here Be Dragons The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLs [Corrected Audio]" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/z8thoG7gPd0?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FAddMember&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-8345" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for Here Be Dragons The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLs [Corrected Audio]" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/z8thoG7gPd0?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

## Abuse Info

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -47,4 +47,4 @@ You may be able to completely evade those features by downgrading to PowerShell
## References
* [https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1)
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8thoG7gPd0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8thoG7gPd0)
* [https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4728](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4728)
* [https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4728](https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4728)
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/add-self.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -3,14 +3,14 @@ title: AddSelf
description: "This edge indicates the principal has the ability to add itself to the target security group. Because of security group delegation, the members of a security group have the same privileges as that group."
---

<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>


By adding yourself to a group and refreshing your token, you gain all the same privileges that group has.

See this clip for an example of this edge being abused:

<iframe id="youtube-9990" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for Here Be Dragons The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLs [Corrected Audio]" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/z8thoG7gPd0?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FAddSelf&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-9990" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for Here Be Dragons The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLs [Corrected Audio]" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/z8thoG7gPd0?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

## Abuse Info

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/allowed-to-act.mdx
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: AllowedToAct
---
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>


This edge allows an attacker to abuse resource-based constrained delegation to compromise the target. This property is a binary DACL that controls what security principals can pretend to be any domain user to the particular computer object.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Rubeus.exe s4u /user:attackersystem$ /rc4:EF266C6B963C0BB683941032008AD47F /impe
```
See a video walk through of how to execute this attack here:

<iframe id="youtube-453" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for BloodHound 2.1's New Computer Takeover Attack" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/RUbADHcBLKg?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FAllowedToAct&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-453" frameborder="0" allowfull 6D40 screen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for BloodHound 2.1's New Computer Takeover Attack" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/RUbADHcBLKg?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

## Opsec Considerations

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/force-change-password.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ title: ForceChangePassword
description: "This edge indicates that the principal can reset the password of the target user without knowing the current password of that user."
---

<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>


To see an example of this edge being abused, see this clip from Derbycon 2017:

<iframe id="youtube-912" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for Here Be Dragons The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLs [Corrected Audio]" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/z8thoG7gPd0?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FForceChangePassword&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-912" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for Here Be Dragons The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLs [Corrected Audio]" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/z8thoG7gPd0?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

## Abuse Info

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/has-session.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: HasSession
---

<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>


When a user authenticates to a computer, they often leave credentials exposed on the system, which can be retrieved through LSASS injection, token manipulation or theft, or injecting into a user’s process.
Expand All @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ A session does not guarantee credential material is present, only possible.

This video explains how BloodHound CE's session data collection method works:

<iframe id="youtube-7414" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for How BloodHound's Session Collection Works" width="360" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/q86VgM2Tafc?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FHasSession&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-7414" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for How BloodHound's Session Collection Works" width="360" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/q86VgM2Tafc?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

Abuse Info
-----------
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/owns.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Object owners retain the ability to modify object security descriptors, regardle

This clip shows an example of abusing object ownership:

<iframe id="youtube-5688" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FOwns&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-5688" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

Abuse Info[](#heading-1)
------------------------
Expand All @@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ Modifying permissions on an object will generate 4670 and 4662 events on the dom
References[](#heading-3)
------------------------

* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8thoG7gPd0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8thoG7gPd0)
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8thoG7gPd0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8thoG7gPd0)
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/sql-admin.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: SQLAdmin
---

<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>


The user is a SQL admin on the target computer
Expand All @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ For Windows systems that have been joined to an Active Directory domain, the SQL

This clip demonstrates how to abuse this edge:

<iframe id="youtube-1659" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FSQLAdmin&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-1659" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

Abuse Info
-----------
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/write-account-restrictions.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: WriteAccountRestrictions
---

<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>


This edge indicates the principal has the ability to modify several properties on the target principal, most notably the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute. The ability to modify the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity property allows an attacker to abuse resource-based constrained delegation to compromise the remote computer system. This property is a binary DACL that controls what security principals can pretend to be any domain user to the particular computer object.

This clip demonstrates how to abuse this edge:

<iframe id="youtube-4952" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FWriteAccountRestrictions&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-4952" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

Abuse Info
----------
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions docs/resources/edges/write-owner.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -2,15 +2,15 @@
title: WriteOwner
---

<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>
<img noZoom src="/assets/enterprise-AND-community-edition-pill-tag.svg"/>



Object owners retain the ability to modify object security descriptors, regardless of permissions on the object’s DACL.

This clip shows an example of abusing this edge:

<iframe id="youtube-2475" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp;widget_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io%2Fhc%2Fen-us%2Farticles%2FWriteOwner&amp;rel=0&amp;showinfo=0&amp;iv_load_policy=3&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;customControls=true&amp;noCookie=false&amp;enablejsapi=1&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.bloodhoundenterprise.io&amp;widgetid=1" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>
<iframe id="youtube-2475" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" title="Player for 2 11 BloodHound Head to Tail Andy Robbins Rohan Vazarkar" width="100%" height="420" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fqYoOoghqdE?autoplay=0&amp;controls=0&amp;disablekb=1&amp;playsinline=1&amp;cc_load_policy=0&amp;cc_lang_pref=auto&amp" data-gtm-yt-inspected-6="true"></iframe>

Abuse Info
----------
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