Implemented static analysis for client side permissions #4246
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Client side artifacts run on the endpoint without ACL enforcement. This is usually what we want but sometimes the extra permissions can give the user extra permissions on the end point. The artifact writer can specify required permissions which will be enforced by the server prior to collecting the artifact. However, sometimes the artifact can use plugins with high priviledge safely - in that case we do not want to restrict the users that may collect it. For example say the artifact collects autoruns by shelling to the autoruns.exe tool. Even though it is using the execve() plugin this call is safe because the args are fixed and can not be influenced by the user. However if the artifact passed user input into the execve() plugin, the user requires the EXECVE permission. Previously, the artifact could declare EXECVE as a required permission, for artifact uses where user input was directly allowed in execve() calls. This enforces additional checks on the launching user to ensure they have the EXECVE permission. This PR modifies the artifact verifier to track plugin permissions used in the artifact. This allows us to see if the artifact inadvertantly gives the user permissions they do not have. This PR introduces another field to the artifact definition called `implied_permissions` where the artifact writer can declare permissions which the artifact will give but the user does not require those. This helps the verifier identify additional permissions that are accidentally given to users on the client. This PR adds a test to ensure built in artifacts have all necessary permissions declared either in `required_permissions` or `implied_permissions`
Snyk has created this PR to upgrade webpack from 5.99.6 to 5.99.7. See this package in npm: webpack See this project in Snyk: https://app.snyk.io/org/scudette/project/76f4d127-566b-42ef-86f4-bdcbc92b90b4?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&page=upgrade-pr
Snyk has created this PR to upgrade axios from 1.8.4 to 1.9.0. See this package in npm: axios See this project in Snyk: https://app.snyk.io/org/scudette/project/76f4d127-566b-42ef-86f4-bdcbc92b90b4?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&page=upgrade-pr
Snyk has created this PR to upgrade ace-builds from 1.40.0 to 1.40.1. See this package in npm: ace-builds See this project in Snyk: https://app.snyk.io/org/scudette/project/76f4d127-566b-42ef-86f4-bdcbc92b90b4?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&page=upgrade-pr
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Client side artifacts run on the endpoint without ACL enforcement. This is usually what we want but sometimes the extra permissions can give the user extra permissions on the end point. The artifact writer can specify required permissions which will be enforced by the server prior to collecting the artifact. However, sometimes the artifact can use plugins with high priviledge safely - in that case we do not want to restrict the users that may collect it. For example say the artifact collects autoruns by shelling to the autoruns.exe tool. Even though it is using the execve() plugin this call is safe because the args are fixed and can not be influenced by the user. However if the artifact passed user input into the execve() plugin, the user requires the EXECVE permission. Previously, the artifact could declare EXECVE as a required permission, for artifact uses where user input was directly allowed in execve() calls. This enforces additional checks on the launching user to ensure they have the EXECVE permission. This PR modifies the artifact verifier to track plugin permissions used in the artifact. This allows us to see if the artifact inadvertantly gives the user permissions they do not have. This PR introduces another field to the artifact definition called `implied_permissions` where the artifact writer can declare permissions which the artifact will give but the user does not require those. This helps the verifier identify additional permissions that are accidentally given to users on the client. This PR adds a test to ensure built in artifacts have all necessary permissions declared either in `required_permissions` or `implied_permissions` --------- Co-authored-by: snyk-bot <snyk-bot@snyk.io>
scudette
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May 20, 2025
Client side artifacts run on the endpoint without ACL enforcement. This is usually what we want but sometimes the extra permissions can give the user extra permissions on the end point. The artifact writer can specify required permissions which will be enforced by the server prior to collecting the artifact. However, sometimes the artifact can use plugins with high priviledge safely - in that case we do not want to restrict the users that may collect it. For example say the artifact collects autoruns by shelling to the autoruns.exe tool. Even though it is using the execve() plugin this call is safe because the args are fixed and can not be influenced by the user. However if the artifact passed user input into the execve() plugin, the user requires the EXECVE permission. Previously, the artifact could declare EXECVE as a required permission, for artifact uses where user input was directly allowed in execve() calls. This enforces additional checks on the launching user to ensure they have the EXECVE permission. This PR modifies the artifact verifier to track plugin permissions used in the artifact. This allows us to see if the artifact inadvertantly gives the user permissions they do not have. This PR introduces another field to the artifact definition called `implied_permissions` where the artifact writer can declare permissions which the artifact will give but the user does not require those. This helps the verifier identify additional permissions that are accidentally given to users on the client. This PR adds a test to ensure built in artifacts have all necessary permissions declared either in `required_permissions` or `implied_permissions` --------- Co-authored-by: snyk-bot <snyk-bot@snyk.io>
scudette
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May 20, 2025
Client side artifacts run on the endpoint without ACL enforcement. This is usually what we want but sometimes the extra permissions can give the user extra permissions on the end point. The artifact writer can specify required permissions which will be enforced by the server prior to collecting the artifact. However, sometimes the artifact can use plugins with high priviledge safely - in that case we do not want to restrict the users that may collect it. For example say the artifact collects autoruns by shelling to the autoruns.exe tool. Even though it is using the execve() plugin this call is safe because the args are fixed and can not be influenced by the user. However if the artifact passed user input into the execve() plugin, the user requires the EXECVE permission. Previously, the artifact could declare EXECVE as a required permission, for artifact uses where user input was directly allowed in execve() calls. This enforces additional checks on the launching user to ensure they have the EXECVE permission. This PR modifies the artifact verifier to track plugin permissions used in the artifact. This allows us to see if the artifact inadvertantly gives the user permissions they do not have. This PR introduces another field to the artifact definition called `implied_permissions` where the artifact writer can declare permissions which the artifact will give but the user does not require those. This helps the verifier identify additional permissions that are accidentally given to users on the client. This PR adds a test to ensure built in artifacts have all necessary permissions declared either in `required_permissions` or `implied_permissions` --------- Co-authored-by: snyk-bot <snyk-bot@snyk.io>
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Client side artifacts run on the endpoint without ACL enforcement. This is usually what we want but sometimes the extra permissions can give the user extra permissions on the end point.
The artifact writer can specify required permissions which will be enforced by the server prior to collecting the artifact.
However, sometimes the artifact can use plugins with high priviledge safely - in that case we do not want to restrict the users that may collect it.
For example say the artifact collects autoruns by shelling to the autoruns.exe tool. Even though it is using the execve() plugin this call is safe because the args are fixed and can not be influenced by the user. However if the artifact passed user input into the execve() plugin, the user requires the EXECVE permission.
Previously, the artifact could declare EXECVE as a required permission, for artifact uses where user input was directly allowed in execve() calls. This enforces additional checks on the launching user to ensure they have the EXECVE permission.
This PR modifies the artifact verifier to track plugin permissions used in the artifact. This allows us to see if the artifact inadvertantly gives the user permissions they do not have.
This PR introduces another field to the artifact definition called
implied_permissionswhere the artifact writer can declare permissions which the artifact will give but the user does not require those. This helps the verifier identify additional permissions that are accidentally given to users on the client.This PR adds a test to ensure built in artifacts have all necessary permissions declared either in
required_permissionsorimplied_permissions