Add EIP: Available Attestation #9708
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bomanaps
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May 6, 2025
Mart1i1n
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May 6, 2025
g11tech
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SkandaBhat
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May 9, 2025
SkandaBhat
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The commit e70534b (as a parent of 28ef32a) contains errors. |
g11tech
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May 15, 2025
EIPS/eip-7942.md
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| In response to these vulnerabilities, mitigation approaches have been proposed from both academia and industry. They are often designed in an ad-hoc way, addressing one issue at a time. Without formal proof, these mitigation approaches may create new issues. For instance, to mitigate the ex-ante reorg attack and balancing attack, Ethereum implements the *proposer boosting* mechanism. By temporarily adjusting the weight of the block in the current slot, the forks created by the adversary will not become the canonical chain. However, this mitigation approach introduces new issues. A so-called *sandwich reorg attack* was later proposed, exploiting proposer boosting to create a reorg attack. The sandwich reorg attack is a variant of ex-ante reorg attacks where two Byzantine proposers collude to make the blocks by honest validators orphaned. Additionally, many known mitigation solutions lack formal analysis or introduce additional assumptions, e.g., by assuming that the ratio of stake controlled by the adversary is no more than 20%. Therefore, our approach aims to provide a provably secure and efficient solution that is resilient to reorg attacks in Ethereum PoS. | ||
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remove extra new lines (all through the EIP)
g11tech
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g11tech
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We propose a solution to address all known attacks in Ethereum PoS called Available Attestation. We show that all known attacks on Ethereum PoS are some form of reorganization attacks. Different from existing studies that mitigate the attacks in an ad-hoc way, we take a systematic approach and provide an elegant yet efficient solution to reorganization attacks. Our solution is provably secure such that no reorganization attacks can be launched in a synchronous network. In a partially synchronous network, our approach achieves the conventional safety and liveness properties of the consensus protocol, which are even stronger than those of the vanilla Ethereum PoS protocol. Our proposal has been accepted in USENIX Security 2025 (paper).