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The following two new files are added: README.rst bpf_prog_linfo.c Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Tested with facebook internal test suites. It looks good.
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anakryiko
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May 25, 2021
LLVM patch https://reviews.llvm.org/D102712 narrowed the scope of existing R_BPF_64_64 and R_BPF_64_32 relocations, and added three new relocations, R_BPF_64_ABS64, R_BPF_64_ABS32 and R_BPF_64_NODYLD32. The main motivation is to make relocations linker friendly. This change, unfortunately, breaks libbpf build, and we will see errors like below: libbpf: ELF relo #0 in section #6 has unexpected type 2 in /home/yhs/work/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_tcp_nogpl.o Error: failed to link '/home/yhs/work/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_tcp_nogpl.o': Unknown error -22 (-22) The new relocation R_BPF_64_ABS64 is generated and libbpf linker sanity check doesn't understand it. Relocation section '.rel.struct_ops' at offset 0x1410 contains 1 entries: Offset Info Type Symbol's Value Symbol's Name 0000000000000018 0000000700000002 R_BPF_64_ABS64 0000000000000000 nogpltcp_init Look at the selftests/bpf/bpf_tcp_nogpl.c, void BPF_STRUCT_OPS(nogpltcp_init, struct sock *sk) { } SEC(".struct_ops") struct tcp_congestion_ops bpf_nogpltcp = { .init = (void *)nogpltcp_init, .name = "bpf_nogpltcp", }; The new llvm relocation scheme categorizes 'nogpltcp_init' reference as R_BPF_64_ABS64 instead of R_BPF_64_64 which is used to specify ld_imm64 relocation in the new scheme. Let us fix the linker sanity checking by including R_BPF_64_ABS64 and R_BPF_64_ABS32. There is no need to check R_BPF_64_NODYLD32 which is used for .BTF and .BTF.ext. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210522162341.3687617-1-yhs@fb.com
evverx
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Apr 11, 2022
Fixes ``` ./out/bpf-object-fuzzer: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each. Running: CORPUS/036ff286c13e4590646c7ef59435ec642432da8e elf_begin.c:232:20: runtime error: member access within misaligned address 0x000001655e71 for type 'Elf64_Shdr', which requires 8 byte alignment 0x000001655e71: note: pointer points here 00 00 00 7f 45 4c 46 02 02 01 00 00 00 07 fb 00 1d 00 00 6c 69 63 65 42 fb 00 41 00 57 03 00 20 ^ #0 0x574d51 in get_shnum /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:232:20 #1 0x574d51 in file_read_elf /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:296:19 #2 0x569c2c in __libelf_read_mmaped_file /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:559:14 #3 0x58e812 in elf_memory /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_memory.c:49:10 #4 0x4905b4 in bpf_object__elf_init /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:1255:9 #5 0x4905b4 in bpf_object_open /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7104:8 libbpf#6 0x49144e in bpf_object__open_mem /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7171:20 libbpf#7 0x483018 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/libbpf/fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16:8 libbpf#8 0x439389 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x439389) libbpf#9 0x419e2f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x419e2f) libbpf#10 0x421aee in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x421aee) libbpf#11 0x410f96 in main (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410f96) libbpf#12 0x7f153e21255f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f) libbpf#13 0x7f153e21260b in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d60b) libbpf#14 0x410fe4 in _start (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410fe4) SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior elf_begin.c:232:20 in ``` and ``` ./out/bpf-object-fuzzer: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each. Running: CORPUS/446b578d82c47fe177de6fd675f4cb6bae8d1ea9 elf_begin.c:485:40: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset to 0x000002277e70 overflowed to 0x0000021d7e6f #0 0x5748f1 in file_read_elf /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:485:40 #1 0x569c2c in __libelf_read_mmaped_file /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:559:14 #2 0x58e812 in elf_memory /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_memory.c:49:10 #3 0x4905b4 in bpf_object__elf_init /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:1255:9 #4 0x4905b4 in bpf_object_open /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7104:8 #5 0x49144e in bpf_object__open_mem /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7171:20 libbpf#6 0x483018 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/libbpf/fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16:8 libbpf#7 0x439389 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x439389) libbpf#8 0x419e2f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x419e2f) libbpf#9 0x421aee in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x421aee) libbpf#10 0x410f96 in main (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410f96) libbpf#11 0x7f753e38255f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f) libbpf#12 0x7f753e38260b in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d60b) libbpf#13 0x410fe4 in _start (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410fe4) SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior elf_begin.c:485:40 in ```
anakryiko
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Fixes ``` ./out/bpf-object-fuzzer: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each. Running: CORPUS/036ff286c13e4590646c7ef59435ec642432da8e elf_begin.c:232:20: runtime error: member access within misaligned address 0x000001655e71 for type 'Elf64_Shdr', which requires 8 byte alignment 0x000001655e71: note: pointer points here 00 00 00 7f 45 4c 46 02 02 01 00 00 00 07 fb 00 1d 00 00 6c 69 63 65 42 fb 00 41 00 57 03 00 20 ^ #0 0x574d51 in get_shnum /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:232:20 #1 0x574d51 in file_read_elf /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:296:19 #2 0x569c2c in __libelf_read_mmaped_file /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:559:14 #3 0x58e812 in elf_memory /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_memory.c:49:10 #4 0x4905b4 in bpf_object__elf_init /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:1255:9 #5 0x4905b4 in bpf_object_open /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7104:8 #6 0x49144e in bpf_object__open_mem /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7171:20 #7 0x483018 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/libbpf/fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16:8 #8 0x439389 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x439389) #9 0x419e2f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x419e2f) #10 0x421aee in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x421aee) #11 0x410f96 in main (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410f96) #12 0x7f153e21255f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f) #13 0x7f153e21260b in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d60b) #14 0x410fe4 in _start (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410fe4) SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior elf_begin.c:232:20 in ``` and ``` ./out/bpf-object-fuzzer: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each. Running: CORPUS/446b578d82c47fe177de6fd675f4cb6bae8d1ea9 elf_begin.c:485:40: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset to 0x000002277e70 overflowed to 0x0000021d7e6f #0 0x5748f1 in file_read_elf /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:485:40 #1 0x569c2c in __libelf_read_mmaped_file /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_begin.c:559:14 #2 0x58e812 in elf_memory /home/libbpf/elfutils/libelf/elf_memory.c:49:10 #3 0x4905b4 in bpf_object__elf_init /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:1255:9 #4 0x4905b4 in bpf_object_open /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7104:8 #5 0x49144e in bpf_object__open_mem /home/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:7171:20 #6 0x483018 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/libbpf/fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16:8 #7 0x439389 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x439389) #8 0x419e2f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x419e2f) #9 0x421aee in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x421aee) #10 0x410f96 in main (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410f96) #11 0x7f753e38255f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f) #12 0x7f753e38260b in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d60b) #13 0x410fe4 in _start (/home/libbpf/out/bpf-object-fuzzer+0x410fe4) SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior elf_begin.c:485:40 in ```
anakryiko
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Oct 17, 2022
ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928 READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0 #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614) libbpf#1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127 libbpf#2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143 libbpf#3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212 libbpf#4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525 libbpf#5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552 libbpf#6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567 libbpf#7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912 libbpf#8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798 libbpf#9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282 libbpf#10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236 libbpf#11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 libbpf#12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/t 8000 est_progs.c:1062 libbpf#13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 libbpf#14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 libbpf#15 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) 0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) libbpf#1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 libbpf#2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 libbpf#3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 libbpf#4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 libbpf#5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 libbpf#6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032 libbpf#7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232 libbpf#8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 libbpf#9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 libbpf#10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 libbpf#11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 libbpf#12 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) libbpf#1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 libbpf#2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 libbpf#3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 libbpf#4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 libbpf#5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 libbpf#6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070 libbpf#7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102 libbpf#8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162 libbpf#9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 libbpf#10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 libbpf#11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 libbpf#12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 libbpf#13 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed, so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing use-after-free. Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map. Fixes: 919d2b1dbb07 ("libbpf: Allow modification of BTF and add btf__add_str API") Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221011120108.782373-2-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
anakryiko
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ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928 READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0 #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614) #1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127 #2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143 #3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212 #4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525 #5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552 #6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567 #7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912 #8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798 #9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282 #10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236 #11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #15 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) 0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032 #7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232 #8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #12 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4) #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191 #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163 #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106 #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157 #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519 #6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070 #7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102 #8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162 #9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875 #10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062 #11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697 #12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #13 0xaaaab5d65990 (test_progs+0x185990) The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed, so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing use-after-free. Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map. Fixes: 919d2b1dbb07 ("libbpf: Allow modification of BTF and add btf__add_str API") Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221011120108.782373-2-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
danielocfb
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Original change: undetermined Change-Id: If8774abe96a80efbeae6708d5e17ef2667c5c562
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anakryiko
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Jan 4, 2024
An issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 4206 in libbpf.c (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 libbpf#1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706 libbpf#2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437 libbpf#3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497 libbpf#4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16 libbpf#5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one () libbpf#6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope () libbpf#7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir () libbpf#8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} () libbpf#9 0x00000000005f2601 in main () (gdb) scn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c): if (rel->r_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size) { The scn_data is derived from the code above: scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx); scn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn); relo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr->sh_name); sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn); if (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don't check whether scn_data is NULL return -EINVAL; In certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file, it is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer Signed-off-by: Mingyi Zhang <zhangmingyi5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Liu <liuxin350@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Changye Wu <wuchangye@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231221033947.154564-1-liuxin350@huawei.com
anakryiko
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Jan 5, 2024
An issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 4206 in libbpf.c (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 #1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706 #2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437 #3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497 #4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16 #5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one () #6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope () #7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir () #8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} () #9 0x00000000005f2601 in main () (gdb) scn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c): if (rel->r_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size) { The scn_data is derived from the code above: scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx); scn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn); relo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr->sh_name); sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn); if (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don't check whether scn_data is NULL return -EINVAL; In certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file, it is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer Signed-off-by: Mingyi Zhang <zhangmingyi5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Liu <liuxin350@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Changye Wu <wuchangye@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231221033947.154564-1-liuxin350@huawei.com
the80srobot
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Mar 5, 2025
An issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 4206 in libbpf.c (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 libbpf#1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706 libbpf#2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437 libbpf#3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497 libbpf#4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16 libbpf#5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one () libbpf#6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope () libbpf#7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir () libbpf#8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} () libbpf#9 0x00000000005f2601 in main () (gdb) scn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c): if (rel->r_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size) { The scn_data is derived from the code above: scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx); scn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn); relo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr->sh_name); sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn); if (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don't check whether scn_data is NULL return -EINVAL; In certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file, it is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer Signed-off-by: Mingyi Zhang <zhangmingyi5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Liu <liuxin350@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Changye Wu <wuchangye@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231221033947.154564-1-liuxin350@huawei.com
anakryiko
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Apr 29, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) libbpf#1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 libbpf#2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 libbpf#3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 libbpf#4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 libbpf#5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 libbpf#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 libbpf#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) libbpf#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) libbpf#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) libbpf#1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) libbpf#2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) libbpf#3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947c1b3c ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947c1b3c ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
anakryiko
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 29, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947c1b3c ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for 6017 detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947c1b3c ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
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The following two new files are added:
README.rst
bpf_prog_linfo.c
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song yhs@fb.com